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Abstract
The article studies navigability of an autonomous agent in a maze where some
rooms may be indistinguishable. In a previous work the authors have shown that
the properties of navigability in such a setting depend on whether an agent has
perfect recall. Navigability by an agent with perfect recall is a transitive relation
and without is not transitive.
This article introduces a notion of restricted navigability and shows that a cer-
tain form of transitivity holds for restricted navigability, even for an agent without
perfect recall. The main technical result is a sound and complete logical system
describing the properties of restricted navigability.
1 Introduction
Autonomous agents such as self-navigating missiles, self-driving cars, and robotic vac-
uum cleaners are often facing the challenge of navigating under conditions of uncer-
tainty about their exact location. A solution to such a problem can be formally de-
scribed as a sequence of instructions that transition a system from one state to another,
assuming that the agent cannot distinguish some of the states. We refer to such systems
as epistemic transition systems.
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Figure 1: Epistemic transition system T0.
Figure 1 depicts an example of an epistemic transition system T0. This system
consists of eight states a through h. The agent cannot distinguish state a from state g
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and state c from state e, which is shown in the figure by dashed lines connecting indis-
tinguishable states. The directed arrows in the figure represent the possible transitions
that the system can take. The labels on the arrows specify the instructions that the agent
needs to use to accomplish this transition. For example, the agent can use instruction 1
to transition the system from state a to state b.
1.1 Navigability
The agent can combine multiple instructions into a strategy to navigate between states
that are not directly connected. For example, the agent can apply a strategy that uses
instruction 1 repeatedly to navigate from state h to state d.
1.1.1 Amnesic vs Recall Strategies
We assume that the strategy is “hardwired” into the agent’s read-only memory and can-
not be changed once the navigation starts. It is crucial for our discussion to distinguish
agents that, in addition to read-only memory, are also equipped with read-write mem-
ory. A strategy of the former agent can make the decisions which instruction to use
based only on the available information about the current location. A strategy of the
latter agent can make such decisions based on the logs of the states the agent previously
visited and the instructions the agents used in the past.
An example of these two type of agents are Roomba and Neato, two popular brands
of robotic vacuum cleaners. Although Roomba has read-write memory to keep a clean-
ing schedule, it does not use this memory for navigation. As a result, its behavior
is completely determined by the information about the machine’s current location: it
changes the direction if it hits a wall, it spins if it encounters a dirty spot, etc. On the
other hand, Neato scans the room before cleaning and uses this information to navigate.
Thus, its strategy is based not only on the information about the current location, but
also on the previously obtained information stored in read-write memory.
An agent that has no read-write memory can only use the available information
about the current location while deciding which strategy to use. Any strategy of this
agent must use the same instruction in all indistinguishable states. Such a strategy can
be formally defined as a function from classes of indistinguishable states into instruc-
tions. In this article we refer to such strategies as amnesic strategies. An example
of an amnesic strategy is the algorithm hardwired into Roomba vacuum cleaners by
the manufacturer. An ideal agent that has an unlimited size of read-write memory can
keep logs of all the states the agent previously visited and all the instructions the agent
used in the past. Such an agent is usually called an agent with perfect recall. In this
article we use the term recall strategy to describe any strategy that potentially can be
employed by an agent with perfect recall. Formally, recall strategy is a function that
maps indistinguishability classes of histories into instructions. Although Neato only
has a finite memory, the strategy that it uses is a recall strategy.
In epistemic transition system T0 depicted in Figure 1, there is no amnesic strategy
to navigate from state b to state f . Indeed, any such strategy would have to use the
same instruction i0 in indistinguishable states a and g. If i0 “ 1, then the agent has to
use instruction 1 in state a. Thus, when navigating from state b the system is “locked”
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Figure 2: “Locked” area in epistemic transition system T0.
among states b, a, c, and d, unable to reach states h, g, f , and e, see Figure 2. Similarly,
if i0 “ 0, then the agent has to use instruction 0 in state g. Thus, when navigating from
state b the system is locked among states b, a, h, g, c, and d, unable to reach states e and
f .
However, there is a recall strategy to navigate from state b to state f in system T0.
An example of such a strategy is a strategy that uses instruction 0 until it visits the class
of indistinguishable states ras “ ta, gu for the second time. After that it switches to
instruction 1.
1.1.2 Strategies between Classes
In epistemic transition system T0, there is a strategy to navigate from state c to state a
by using instruction 0 all the time. However, if the agent is deployed in state c, then
she does not know that such a strategy exists because she cannot distinguish state c
from state e, from which instruction 0 would lock her in state d. Additionally, if the
agent does not have perfect recall, then even if she decides to use such a strategy to
reach state a, she would not be able to verify that the goal is accomplished because she
cannot distinguish state a from state g. For these reasons, in this article we consider
navigability not between individual states, but between classes of indistinguishable
states. For example, a strategy that uses instruction 1 in all states is an amnesic strategy
to navigate from class ras “ ta, gu to class rcs “ tc, eu. Indeed, starting from state a
such strategy leads to state c and starting from state g this strategy leads to state e.
At the same time, not only is there no amnesic, but there is also no recall strategy
to navigate from class rcs to class ras. Indeed, consider two situations when the system
starts in (i) state c and (ii) state e. The histories of the transitions in these two cases
consist only of states c and e respectively. Thus, these two histories are indistinguish-
able and a recall strategy would have to use the same instruction i0 in both settings. If
i0 “ 1, then from state c the system transitions into state d and remains locked there.
If i0 “ 0, then from state e the system also transitions into state d and remains locked
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there. In either of these two cases the system is not able to reach a state in class ras.
As one would expect, there are situations when there is a recall strategy, but no
amnesic strategy to navigate between two classes. For example, there is a recall strategy
to navigate from class ras to class rbs. Perhaps unexpectedly, this strategy always uses
instruction 0 on the first transition. Then, it switches to repeatedly using instruction 1.
Starting from either state a or state g, this strategy first transitions the system into state
g, then into state a, then into state b. Thus, it is a recall strategy to navigate from class
ras to class rbs. To show that there is no amnesic strategy to navigate from class ras to
class rbs, note that any such strategy would have to use the same instruction i0 in state
a and state g. If i0 “ 0 and the navigation starts from state a, then the system is locked
among states a, h, and g and never reaches states b, c, d, e, and f . If i0 “ 1 and the
navigation starts from state g, then the system is locked among states g, f, e, and d and
never reaches states h, a, b, and c.
ras rbs rcs rds rf s rhs
ras a r a r r a
rbs a a a a r a
rcs - - a r - -
rds - - - a - -
rf s a r a a a a
rhs a a a a a a
Table 1: Navigability between classes in system T0.
Table 1 shows what kind of strategies exist between classes of states in the epis-
temic transition system T0. Letter “a” at the intersection of row x and column y marks
the cases when there is an amnesic strategy from class x to class y. Letter “r” denotes
the cases where there are recall but no amnesic strategies. Dash “-” marks the cases
where neither amnesic nor recall strategies exist.
An interesting observation about Table 1 is that there is a recall but no amnesic
strategy to navigate from class rcs to class rds. An example of such a recall strategy
is a strategy that first uses instruction 0 and then repeatedly uses instruction 1. If this
recall strategy is used starting from state e, then the system transitions directly into
state d. If the system starts from state c, then the system first transitions to state b using
instruction 0, then to back to state c using instruction 1, and finally from state c to state
d this time using instruction 1.
We now show that there is no amnesic strategy s to navigate from class rcs to class
rds. Suppose the opposite. By sras and srcs we denote the instructions used by strategy
s in all states of classes ras and rcs respectively. Since both sras and srcs can have either
value 0 or value 1, there are four cases to consider. If sras “ srcs “ 0, then strategy s
can be used to navigate from state e to state d. However, if the navigation starts in state
c, then the system is locked among state c, b, a, h, and g and it never reaches states f ,
e, and d. If sras “ 1 and srcs “ 0, then when the system starts from state c it is locked
among states c, b, and a. The other two cases are similar.
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1.1.3 Strategies between Sets of Classes
As we have seen above, there is a recall strategy, but no amnesic strategy to navigate
from class ras to class rbs. One can similarly show that there is a recall strategy, but
no amnesic strategy to navigate from class ras to class rf s. However, if the goal is to
navigate from class ras to either class rbs or class rf s, then there is an amnesic strategy
to achieve this. An example of such a strategy is the strategy that uses instruction 1 in
all states. This strategy directly transitions the system from any state in class ras to a
state in either class rbs or class rf s. This example shows that navigability to a set of
classes cannot be reduced to navigability to classes.
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Figure 3: Epistemic transition system T1.
Our next example shows that navigability from a sets of classes cannot be reduced to
navigability from classes. Consider epistemic transition system T1 depicted in Figure 3.
Amnesic strategy that always invokes instruction 1 can be used to transition this system
from class rbs to class rds. At the same time, amnesic strategy that always invokes
instruction 0 can be used to transition this system from class rf s to class rds. However,
there is no single amnesic strategy that would transition the system from an arbitrary
state of an arbitrary class of set trbs, rf su to a state in a class of set trdsu. Indeed,
any such strategy would have to use the same instruction i0 in indistinguishable states
c and e. If i0 “ 0, then from state b the system cannot reach state d because it is
locked among states b and c. If i0 “ 1, then from state e the system cannot reach state
d because it is locked among states f and e. The same example can be made using
classes rbs, rf s, and rds in the original epistemic transition system T0, but the proof
that an amnesic strategy does not exist is more involved.
The above two examples, show that navigability between sets of classes cannot be
expressed in terms of navigability between classes. In this article, we study this more
general notion of navigability between sets of classes. If A and B are two sets of
classes, then we use notation A B B to denote the existence of a strategy to navigate
from set A to set B. Whether we mean an amnesic or a recall strategy will be clear
from the context.
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1.1.4 Universal properties
So far, we have discussed properties of navigability specific to epistemic transition
system T0. In this article we study properties of navigability that are universally true in
all epistemic transition systems. Two examples of such properties are
1. Reflexivity: ABB, where A Ď B, and
2. Augmentation: ABB Ñ pAY CqB pB Y Cq.
The first of these properties claims that there is always a navigation strategy to navigate
from a set to a superset of the set. Any strategy can be used to do this because the goal
is achieved before the navigation even starts. The second property says that if there
is a strategy to navigate from set A to set B, then there is a strategy to navigate from
set A Y C to set B Y C. This property is true because the very same strategy that is
used to navigate from set A to set B can also be used to navigate from set A Y C to
set B Y C. Both of the above properties are universally true for amnesic as well as for
recall strategies. An example of a property universally true for recall strategies but not
universally true for amnesic strategies is
3. Transitivity: ABB Ñ pB B C Ñ AB Cq.
This property says that if there is a navigation strategy from set A to set B and another
navigation strategy from set B to set C, then there is a navigation strategy from set A
to set C. To see that this property is not universally true for amnesic strategies, notice
that in epistemic transition system T0 the agent can transition the system from set trasu
to set trhsu using the amnesic strategy that always invokes instruction 0. She can also
transition the system from set trhsu to set trbsu using the amnesic strategy that always
invokes instruction 1. Yet, as we have seen earlier, there is no amnesic strategy to
navigate from set trasu to set trbsu. In our previous work [1], we have shown that the
Transitivity principle is universally true for recall strategies. In the same paper we have
also shown that the Reflexivity, the Augmentation, and the Transitivity principles give
a complete axiomatization of all universal properties of recall strategies. These three
axioms are known in the database literature as Armstrong axioms [2, p. 81]. They
give a sound and complete axiomatization of the properties of functional dependency
relation in databases [3].
As we have seen, the Transitivity principle is not universally true for amnesic strate-
gies. In [1] we gave a complete axiomatization of all properties of amnesic strategies.
This axiomatization, in addition to the Reflexivity principle and the Augmentation prin-
ciple, also contains
4. Left Monotonicity: A1 BB Ñ ABB, where A Ď A1, and
5. Right Monotonicity: ABB Ñ ABB1, where B Ď B1.
It can be shown that the Left and the Right Monotonicity principles are provable from
Armstrong axioms. Thus, the single principle that distinguishes universal properties
of recall strategies from the universal properties of amnesic strategies is Armstrong’s
Transitivity axiom. Perhaps unexpectedly, this single principle captures the additional
properties of navigability associated with the assumption of perfect recall by the agent.
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1.1.5 Can Transitivity be Saved?
Transitivity is an intuitively expected property for navigability to have. To us, the fact
that navigability under amnesic strategies does not have this property is surprising and
counter-intuitive. In the current article we answer the question if there is some form of
transitivity that still can be claimed without the assumption of total recall.
Our answer to this question is that a form of transitivity is true for amnesic strategies
if, instead of the navigability relation, one considers the restricted navigability.
1.2 Restricted Navigability
As we have seen earlier, there is an amnesic strategy to navigate from class ras to
class rcs in epistemic transition system T0 depicted in Figure 1. An example of such a
strategy is an amnesic strategy that uses instruction 1 in each state. Imagine now that
the system is restricted from transitioning through class rf s. There is still a strategy to
navigate from class ras to class rcs under this restriction, but transitioning from state g
to class rcs will now have to go through states h, a, and b. Any strategy that navigates
from class ras to class rcs and avoids class rf s would need to be a recall strategy
because it must use instruction 1 in state a and instruction 0 in state g.
In this article we study the universal properties of the restricted navigability relation
ABB C, where A, B, and C are sets of classes. Informally, ABB C means that there
is a strategy to navigate from set A to set C while staying in set B. Formal semantics
of relation ABB C is given in Definition 7. For now let us just note that the restriction
“staying in set B” does not apply to destination states. That is, the final point of a
navigation path can be outside of setB. This is a technical detail that makes the axioms
of our logical system more elegant. One can think about the subscript as the set where
the agent actually uses the strategy to determine the instruction. Once the set C is
reached, no further instructions are needed.
The following form of the Transitivity principle is valid for the restricted naviga-
bility under the amnesic strategies:
ABB C Ñ pC BD E Ñ ABBYD Eq, where B XD “ ∅. (1)
We prove the soundness of this principle in Lemma 11.
1.2.1 Universal Principles
In this article we give a sound and complete axiomatization of the universal properties
of relation A BB C. This axiomatization contains a modified version of Armstrong’s
Reflexivity principle:
ABB C, where A Ď C, (2)
a modified version of Armstrong’s Augmentation principle:
ABB C Ñ pAYDqBB pC YDq, (3)
and the modified version (1) of Armstrong’s Transitivity principle. Note that transitiv-
ity principle (1) can be stated in a more general form where the restriction BXD “ ∅
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is replaced withBXD Ď C. We prove this seemingly more general form of transitivity
from principle (1) and the rest of the axioms of our logical system in Lemma 6.
In addition to the modified versions of three Armstrong’s axioms described above,
our logical system contains three more axioms. The first of these axioms is
ABB C Ñ ABBzC C. (4)
This axiom says that if there is a strategy to navigate from set A to set C passing only
through set B, then there is a strategy to navigate from set A to set C passing only
through set BzC. Indeed, once a state of a class of the set C is reached for the first
time, there is no need to continue the execution of the strategy. Thus, the navigation
path will never have to pass through set B X C. In essence, the axiom states that the
execution of any strategy can be terminated once the desired goal is reached for the
first time. For this reason we refer to principle (4) as the Early Bird principle.
Before we state the remaining two axioms of our logical system, we need to discuss
the meaning of the statementAB∅∅. It claims that there is a strategy to navigate from
each state in each class of set A to a state in an empty set of classes. This is only
possible if all classes in set A are empty. Although in mathematics it is common to
consider only nonempty equivalence classes, in this article we allow for empty classes
as well. For example, when navigating in a maze one might consider a strategy that
takes a left door in all red rooms, even if the class of red rooms is empty. In fact, we
allow multiple empty classes: an empty class of red rooms, an empty class of blue
rooms, etc. In different empty classes the strategy might use different instructions. The
technical details of our semantics are described in Section 3. For now let us just point
out that statement AB∅ ∅ means that all classes in set A are empty.
We are now ready to state the two remaining axioms of our logical system. One of
them is
AB∅ B Ñ AzB B∅ ∅. (5)
It states that if there is a strategy to navigate from each state in each class in set A to
a state in a class of set B through an empty set of classes, then all starting states in
classes from set A must already be in classes of set B. In other words, classes in set
AzB must be empty. We call this the Trivial Path principle.
The last axiom of our logical system is
ABB ∅Ñ AB∅ ∅. (6)
It states that if there is a strategy to navigate from each state in each class in set A to a
state in a class of an empty set, then classes in set A must be empty. We call this the
Path to Nowhere principle.
Our main results are the soundness and completeness theorems for the logical sys-
tem consisting of axioms (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6).
1.3 Literature Review
Most of the existing literature on logical systems for reasoning about strategies is fo-
cused on modal logics for coalition strategies. Logics of coalition power were proposed
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by Marc Pauly [4, 5], who also proved the completeness of the basic logic of coalition
power. Pauly’s approach has been widely studied in literature [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12].
An alternative, binary-modality-based, logical system was proposed by More and Nau-
mov [13].
Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman introduced the Alternating-Time Temporal Logic
(ATL) that combines temporal and coalition modalities [14]. Van der Hoek and Wool-
dridge proposed to combine ATL with epistemic modality to form Alternating-Time
Temporal Epistemic Logic [15]. However, they did not prove the completeness the-
orem for the proposed logical system. A completeness theorem for a logical system
that combines coalition power and epistemic modalities was proven by A˚gotnes and
Alechina [16].
The notion of a strategy that we consider in this article is much more restrictive
than the the notion of strategy in the works mentioned above. Namely, we assume
that the strategy must be based only on the information available to the agent. This is
captured in our setting by requiring the strategy to be the same in all indistinguishable
states or all indistinguishable histories. This restriction on strategies has been studied
before under different names. Jamroga and A˚gotnes talk about “knowledge to identify
and execute a strategy” [17], Jamroga and van der Hoek discuss “difference between
an agent knowing that he has a suitable strategy and knowing the strategy itself” [18].
Van Benthem calls such strategies “uniform” [19]. Naumov and Tao [20] used the term
“executable strategy”. A˚gotnes and Alechina gave a complete axiomatization of an in-
terplay between single-agent knowledge and know-how modalities [21]. Naumov and
Tao [20] axiomatized interplay between distributed knowledge modality and know-how
coalition strategies for enforcing a condition indefinitely. A similar complete logical
system in a single-agent setting for know-how strategies to achieve a goal in multiple
steps rather than to maintain a goal is developed by Fervari, Herzig, Li, Wang [22].
Naumov and Tao proposed a complete trimodal logical system that describes an inter-
play between distributed knowledge, coalition power, and know-how coalition power
modalities for goals achievable in one steps [23]. All of the above works do not con-
sider a perfect recall setting. Modal logic that combines distributed knowledge with
coalition power in a perfect recall setting has been recently proposed by Naumov and
Tao [24]. Unlike this article, they only consider goals achievable in one step.
Our work is closely connected to Wang’s logic of knowing how [25, 26] and es-
pecially to Li and Wang’s logic of knowing how with intermediate constraints [27].
The latter logical system describes the properties of the ternary modality Khmpa, b, cq.
The modality stands for “there is a strategy to navigate from a to b while passing only
through c”. Although in [27] variables a, b, and c stand for statements, not sets of
classes, like in our article, this difference is not very significant. The significant differ-
ence between Li and Wang’s approach and ours is how we define strategy. They define
strategy as a sequence of instructions that, when executed in the given order, lead from
one state to another. For example, according to their definition, there is a strategy to
navigate from state c to state a of the epistemic transition system depicted in Figure 1.
The strategy is the sequence 00. In other words, unlike our approach, their notion of
strategy does not allow the agent to change her behaviour based on her current ob-
servations. In terms of our motivation example, their agent is a robot without sensors
equipped with a stack that stores the list of instructions to be executed. This differ-
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ence in semantics results in very different logical systems. For example, Armstrong’s
Transitivity principle, rephrased in their language, is valid under their semantics.
Our current work builds on our previous paper [1], where we have shown that Arm-
strong axioms are sound and complete with respect to (unrestricted) navigability with
recall strategies. In the same work we proved that logical system consisting of the Re-
flexivity, the Augmentation, the Left Monotonicity, and the Right Monotonicity axioms
is sound and complete with respect to (unrestricted) navigability with amnesic strate-
gies. Formally, the main contribution of this work is a sound and complete logical sys-
tem for restricted navigability under amnesic strategies. Informally, our contribution
is the observation that there is a middle ground setting in which a form of transitivity
holds even for agents without perfect recall.
1.4 Article Outline
The rest of this article is structured as following. In Section 2 we introduce the syntax
of our logical system. In Section 3 we define the formal semantics of this system. Sec-
tion 4 lists the axioms of our system. In Section 5 we give several examples of formal
derivations. These results will be used later in the proof of completeness. Section 6 and
Section 7 prove the soundness and the completeness of our logical system respectively.
Section 8 concludes.
2 Syntax
In the introduction we discussed the ternary relation A BB C as a relation between
three sets of indistinguishability classes of a given epistemic transition system. In the
rest of this article we present a formal logical system capturing the universally true
properties of this relation in an arbitrary epistemic transition system. Note that sets of
classes A, B and C are specific to a particular epistemic transition system and thus can
not be used to formally state properties common to all epistemic transition systems.
In this article we overcome this issue by assuming that there is a fixed finite set V of
views. A transition model specifies an observation function from states to views instead
of specifying an indistinguishability relation between states. Informally, two states are
indistinguishable if and only if the values of the observation function on these two
states are equal. Using views instead of classes the language of our logical system can
be defined independently from a particular epistemic transition system as follows.
Definition 1. Let Φ be the minimal set of formulae such that
1. ABB C P Φ for each sets A,B,C Ď V ,
2.  ϕ,ϕÑ ψ P Φ, for each ϕ,ψ P Φ.
The above assumption that set of views V is finite is used later in the proof of
completeness.
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3 Semantics
In this section we define formal semantics of our logical system.
Definition 2. Epistemic transition system is a tuple pS, o, I, tÑiuiPIq, where
1. S is a set of states,
2. o : S Ñ V is an observation function,
3. I is a set of instructions,
4. Ñi is a binary relation between states for each i P I .
For example, for the epistemic transition system T0 depicted in Figure 1, set S is
ta, b, c, d, e, f, g, hu. Observation function o is such that opaq “ opgq “ v1, opbq “ v2,
opcq “ opeq “ v3, opdq “ v4, opfq “ v5 and ophq “ v6, where v1, v2, v3, v4, v5,
and v6 are arbitrary distinctive elements of set V . Instruction set I is t0, 1u. Rela-
tion Ñ0 is tpa, hq, pb, aq, pc, bq, pd, dq, pe, dq, pf, gq, pg, hq, ph, gqu and relation Ñ1 is
tpa, bq, pb, cq, pc, dq, pd, dq, pe, fq, pf, eq, pg, fq, ph, aqu.
Note that epistemic transition system T0 is deterministic in the sense that there is
a unique state v into which the system transitions from a given state w under a given
instruction i. Definition 2 specifies a transition system in terms of a transitive relation
Ñi. We allow several states v such that w Ñi v to model nondeterministic transi-
tions. We allow the set of such states v to be empty to model terminating transitions.
Informally, if in a state w an instruction i is invoked such that there is no v for which
w Ñi v, then the system terminates and no further instructions are executed.
In the introduction we made a distinction between amnesic and recall strategies.
Since the rest of the article deals only with amnesic strategies, we refer to such strate-
gies simply as strategies.
Definition 3. A strategy is an arbitrary function from V to I .
A side effect of our choice to use views instead of equivalence classes is that there
might be one or more views that are not values of the observation function on any state
in the epistemic transition system. Such views define what we call “empty equivalence
classes” in the introduction. Per Definition 3, a strategy must still be defined on such
views.
The next definition specifies the paths in an epistemic transition system that start in
a given set of views and are compatible with a given strategy.
Definition 4. For any set A Ď V and any strategy s, let PathspAq be the set of all
(finite or infinite) sequences w0, w1, w2, ¨ ¨ ¨ P S such that
1. opw0q P A, and
2. wk Ñspopwkqq wk`1 for each k ě 0 for which wk`1 exists.
For epistemic transition system T0, sequence a, b, c belongs to set Pathsptopaquq,
where opaq is the view assigned in system in T0 to state a and s is a strategy such that
spvq “ 1 for each v P V .
A path pi1 is an extension of a path pi if pi is a prefix of pi1 or pi1 “ pi.
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Definition 5. MaxPathspAq is the set of all sequences in PathspAq that are either
infinite or cannot be extended to a longer sequence in PathspAq.
For epistemic transition system T0, the infinite sequence a, b, c, d, d, . . . belongs to
the set MaxPathsptopaquq, where opaq is the view assigned in that epistemic transi-
tion system to state a and s is a strategy such that spvq “ 1 for each v P V .
Lemma 1. Any sequence that is in set PathspAq can be extended to a sequence in set
MaxPathspAq.
Proof. Any sequence in PathspAq which is not in MaxPathspAq can be extended to
a longer sequence in PathspAq. Repeating this step multiple times one can get a finite
or an infinite sequence in MaxPathspAq.
The next definition introduces a technical notation that we use to define the seman-
tics of the restricted navigability relation ABB C.
Definition 6. Let UntilpA,Bq be the set of all such sequences w0, w1, w2, . . . that
there is k0 ě 0 where
1. opwkq P A for each k ă k0 and
2. opwk0q P B.
Definition 7. For any epistemic transition system T and any formula ϕ, satisfiability
relation T ( ϕ is defined as follows:
1. T ( ABB C if MaxPathspAq Ď UntilpB,Cq for some strategy s,
2. T (  ϕ if T * ϕ,
3. T ( ϕÑ ψ if T * ϕ or T ( ψ.
4 Axioms
In addition to the propositional tautologies in language Φ, our logical system contains
the following axioms:
1. Reflexivity: ABB C, where A Ď C,
2. Augmentation: ABB C Ñ pAYDqBB pC YDq,
3. Transitivity: ABB C Ñ pC BD E Ñ ABBYD Eq, where B XD “ ∅,
4. Early Bird: ABB C Ñ ABBzC C,
5. Trivial Path: AB∅ B Ñ pAzBqB∅ ∅,
6. Path to Nowhere: ABB ∅Ñ AB∅ ∅.
We write $ ϕ if formula ϕ is provable in our logical system using the Modus Ponens
inference rule. We writeX $ ϕ if formula ϕ is provable from the axioms of our system
and the set of additional axioms X .
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5 Examples of Derivations
The soundness and the completeness of our logical system is proven in Section 6 and
Section 7. In this section we give several examples of formal derivations in this system.
The results obtained here are used in the proof of the completeness.
Lemma 2. $ ABB C Ñ A1 BB C, where A1 Ď A.
Proof. Assumption A1 Ď A implies that $ A1 B∅ A by the Reflexivity axiom. Hence,
$ A BB C Ñ A1 B∅YB C by the Transitivity axiom. Therefore, $ A BB C Ñ
A1 BB C.
Lemma 3. $ ABB C Ñ ABB1 C, where B Ď B1.
Proof. By the Reflexivity axiom, $ A BB1zB A. Hence, by the Transitivity axiom,
$ A BB C Ñ A BpB1zBqYB C. Therefore, $ A BB C Ñ A BB1 C, due to the
assumption B Ď B1.
Lemma 4. $ ABB C Ñ ABB C 1, where C Ď C 1.
Proof. By the Transitivity axiom, $ ABB C Ñ pC B∅ C 1 Ñ ABB C 1q. Hence, by
the laws of logical reasoning,
$ C B∅ C 1 Ñ pABB C Ñ ABB C 1q. (7)
At the same time, the assumptionC Ď C 1 implies$ CB∅C 1 by the Reflexivity axiom.
Hence, ABB C Ñ ABB C 1 due to statement (7).
Lemma 5. $ B1 B∅ ∅Ñ pABB C Ñ ABBzB1 Cq.
Proof. First, $ A BB C Ñ A BB pC Y B1q by Lemma 4. Second, the formula
ABB pCYB1q Ñ ABBzpCYB1q pCYB1q is an instance of the Early Bird axiom. Third,
$ ABBzpCYB1q pC YB1q Ñ ABBzB1 pC YB1q by Lemma 3 because BzpC YB1q Ď
BzB1. The three statements above by the laws of propositional reasoning imply that
$ ABB C Ñ ABBzB1 pC YB1q. (8)
At the same time,
B1 B∅ ∅Ñ pB1 Y CqB∅ C (9)
is an instance of the Augmentation axiom. Finally, the formula
ABBzB1 pC YB1q Ñ ppB1 Y CqB∅ C Ñ ABBzB1 Cq (10)
is an instance of the Transitivity axiom. Taken together, statement (8), statement (9),
and statement (10) imply by the laws of propositional reasoning that $ B1 B∅ ∅ Ñ
pABB C Ñ ABBzB1 Cq.
Lemma 6. $ ABB C Ñ pC BD E Ñ ABBYD Eq if B XD Ď C.
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Proof. Assumption B X D Ď C implies that BzC Ď BzD. Thus, by Lemma 3,
$ ABBzC C Ñ ABBzD C. At the same time $ ABB C Ñ ABBzC C by the Early
Bird axiom. Hence, by the laws of propositional reasoning,
$ ABB C Ñ ABBzD C.
Note that A BBzD C Ñ pC BD E Ñ A BBYD Eq is an instance of the Transitivity
axiom. Therefore,$ ABBC Ñ pCBDE Ñ ABBYDEq by the laws of propositional
reasoning.
6 Soundness
In this section we prove the soundness of our logical system. The soundness of each of
the axioms is stated as a separate lemma. The soundness theorem for the logical system
is given in the end of the section. We start with a technical lemma that lists properties
of sets Until and MaxPath. These properties are used in the proofs of the soundness
of the axioms.
Lemma 7. For any set A,B,C Ď V and any strategy s:
1. MaxPathspAq Ď Untilp∅, Aq,
2. MaxPathspAq ĎMaxPathspA1q, where A Ď A1,
3. MaxPathspAYBq “MaxPathspAq YMaxPathspBq,
4. UntilpA,∅q “ ∅,
5. UntilpA,Bq Ď UntilpA,B1q, where B Ď B1,
6. UntilpA,Bq Ď UntilpA1, Bq, where A Ď A1,
7. UntilpA,Bq Ď UntilpAzB,Bq,
8. Untilp∅, Aq X Untilp∅, Bq Ď Untilp∅, AXBq.
Proof. Statements 1 through 8 follow from Definition 5 and Definition 6.
Next, we show the soundness of the Reflexivity and Augmentation axioms.
Lemma 8. If A Ď C, then T ( ABB C.
Proof. By Lemma 7 and the assumption A Ď C,
MaxPathspAq Ď Untilp∅, Aq Ď Untilp∅, Cq Ď UntilpB,Cq.
Therefore, T ( ABB C by Definition 7.
Lemma 9. If T ( ABB C, then T ( pAYDqBB pC YDq.
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Proof. Let T ( A BB C. Thus, MaxPathspAq Ď UntilpB,Cq by Definition 7.
Hence, by Lemma 7,
MaxPathspAYDq “ MaxPathspAq YMaxPathspDq
Ď UntilpB,Cq Y Untilp∅, Dq
Ď UntilpB,Cq Y UntilpB,Dq
Ď UntilpB,C YDq Y UntilpB,C YDq
“ UntilpB,C YDq.
Therefore, T ( A,D BB C,D by Definition 7.
The proof of the soundness of the Transitivity axiom is based on the following
auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 10. If MaxPaths1pAq Ď UntilpB,Cq and s1pvq “ s2pvq for each v P B,
then MaxPaths2pAq Ď UntilpB,Cq.
Proof. Consider any sequence pi “ w0, w1, ¨ ¨ ¨ P MaxPaths2pAq. We prove that
pi P UntilpB,Cq by separating the following two cases:
Case I: opwkq P BzC for each k ě 0. Thus, s1popwkqq “ s2popwkqq due to the
assumption of the lemma that s1pvq “ s2pvq for each view v P B. Hence, the as-
sumption pi P MaxPaths2pAq implies that pi P MaxPaths1pAq by Definition 4.
Therefore, pi P UntilpB,Cq due to the assumption MaxPaths1pAq Ď UntilpB,Cq
of the lemma.
Case II: opwkq R BzC for some k ě 0. Let m ě 0 be the smallest such k that
opwkq R BzC. Thus,
1. opwkq P pBzCq for each k ă m and
2. opwmq R pBzCq.
Hence, opwkq P B for each k ă m. We now further split Case II into two different
parts:
Part A: opwmq P C. Therefore, pi P UntilpB,Cq by Definition 6.
Part B: opwmq R C. Note that condition opwkq P B for each k ă m implies that
s1popwkqq “ s2popwkqq for each k ă m due to the assumption of the lemma that
s1pvq “ s2pvq for each v P B. Thus,w0, w1, . . . , wm P Paths1pAq. By Lemma 1, this
sequence can be extended to a sequence pi1 “ w0, w1, . . . , wm, ¨ ¨ ¨ PMaxPaths1pAq.
At the same time opwkq P B for each integer k ď m by the choice of k and
opwmq R C by the assumption of the case. Thus, pi1 R UntilpB,Cq. Therefore,
pi1 P MaxPaths1pAq but pi1 R UntilpB,Cq, which contradicts the assumption of the
lemma MaxPaths1pAq Ď UntilpB,Cq.
We are now ready to finish the proof of the soundness of the remaining axioms of
our logical system.
Lemma 11. If T ( A BB C and T ( C BD E, then T ( A BBYD E, where
B XD “ ∅.
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Proof. By Definition 7, the assumption T ( ABB C implies that there is a strategy s1
such that MaxPaths1pAq Ď UntilpB,Cq. Similarly, the assumption T ( C BD E
implies that there is a strategy s2 such that MaxPaths2pCq Ď UntilpD,Eq.
Define strategy s as follows
spvq “
#
s1pvq if v P B,
s2pvq otherwise. (11)
By Definition 7, it suffices to show that MaxPathspAq Ď UntilpB YD,Eq. Indeed,
consider any sequence pi “ w0, w1, w2, ¨ ¨ ¨ P MaxPathspAq. We will show that
pi P UntilpB YD,Eq.
Note that s1pvq “ spvq for each v P B by equation (11). Also MaxPaths1pAq Ď
UntilpB,Cq by the choice of strategy s1. Thus, MaxPathspAq Ď UntilpB,Cq
By Lemma 10. Hence, pi P UntilpB,Cq because pi P MaxPathspAq. Thus, by
Definition 6, there is an integer k0 ě 0 such that
1. opwkq P B for each integer k such that k ă k0,
2. opwk0q P C.
Note that s2pvq “ spvq for each view v P D by equation (11) and the assumption
B X D “ ∅. Also, MaxPaths2pCq Ď UntilpD,Eq by the choice of strategy s2.
Thus, MaxPathspCq Ď UntilpD,Eq by Lemma 10. Consider now the sequence
pi1 “ wk0 , wk0`1, wk0`2, ¨ ¨ ¨ P MaxPathspCq. Then, pi1 P UntilpD,Eq. Hence, by
Definition 6, there is an integer k10 ě k0 such that
1. opwkq P D for each integer k such that k0 ď k ă k10,
2. opwk10q P E.
Therefore, pi P UntilpB YD,Eq by Definition 6.
Lemma 12. If T ( ABB C, then T ( ABBzC C.
Proof. Let T ( A BB C. Thus, MaxPathspAq Ď UntilpB,Cq by Definition 7.
Hence, MaxPathspAq Ď UntilpB,Cq Ď UntilpBzC,Cq, by Lemma 7. Therefore,
T ( ABBzC C by Definition 7.
Lemma 13. If T ( AB∅ B, then T ( pAzBqB∅ ∅.
Proof. By Definition 7, the assumption T ( AB∅ B implies that there is a strategy s
such that MaxPathspAq Ď Untilp∅, Bq. Thus, by Lemma 7,
MaxPathspAzBq ĎMaxPathspAq Ď Untilp∅, Bq.
At the same time, by Lemma 7,
MaxPathspAzBq ĎMaxPathspV zBq Ď Untilp∅, V zBq.
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Thus, by Lemma 7,
MaxPathspAzBq Ď Untilp∅, Bq X Untilp∅, V zBq
“ Untilp∅, B X pV zBqq
“ Untilp∅,∅q.
Therefore, T ( pAzBqB∅ ∅ by Definition 7.
Lemma 14. If T ( ABB ∅, then T ( AB∅ ∅.
Proof. By Definition 7, the assumption T ( ABB ∅ implies that there is a strategy s
such that MaxPathspAq Ď UntilpB,∅q. Thus, by Lemma 7,
MaxPathspAq Ď UntilpB,∅q “ ∅ Ď Untilp∅,∅q.
Therefore, T ( AB∅ ∅ by Definition 7.
We end the section by stating the soundness theorem for our logical system. The
theorem follows from the soundness of the individual axioms shown in the lemmas
above.
Theorem 1. If $ ϕ, then T ( ϕ for each epistemic transition system T .
7 Completeness
Suppose that set X is a maximal consistent set of formulae in the language Φ. In this
section we define a canonical epistemic transition system T pXq “ pS, o, I, tÑiuiPIq
based on set X .
7.1 Valid Views
Depending on the set X , there might be some views in set V for which there are no
states in the canonical epistemic transition system on which the observation function is
equal to these views. Such views correspond to empty classes as discussed in Section 3.
We intend to define the canonical epistemic transition system T pXq in such a way that
a view v has no states in this system if and only if X $ v B∅ ∅. The rest of the views
are referred to as valid views.
Definition 8. V alid “ tv P V | X & v B∅ ∅u.
Below we prove several properties of valid views that are used later in the proof of
the completeness.
Lemma 15. X $ tb1, . . . , bnuB∅∅, for each integer n ě 0 and all views b1, . . . , bn P
V zV alid.
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Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on n. In the case n “ 0, we need to show
that X $ ∅B∅ ∅, which is true by the Reflexivity axiom.
Suppose that X $ tb1, . . . , bn´1u B∅ ∅. Thus, by the Augmentation axiom,
X $ tb1, . . . , bn´1, bnu B∅ bn. On the other hand, the assumption bn P V zV alid
by Definition 8 implies X $ bn B∅ ∅. Therefore, X $ tb1, . . . , bn´1, bnu B∅ ∅ by
the Transitivity axiom.
Lemma 16. X $ ABB C Ñ ABBXV alid C.
Proof. Lemma 15 implies that X $ pBzV alidqB∅ ∅. Hence, by Lemma 5,
X $ ABB C Ñ ABBzpBzV alidq C.
In other words, X $ ABB C Ñ ABBXV alid C.
Lemma 17. X $ ABB C Ñ ABB pC X V alidq.
Proof. Lemma 15 implies that X $ pCzV alidq B∅ ∅. Thus, by the Augmentation
axiom, X $ C B∅ pC X V alidq. At the same time,
ABB C Ñ pC B∅ pC X V alidq Ñ ABB pC X V alidqq
is an instance of the Transitivity axiom. Therefore, by the laws of propositional rea-
soning, X $ ABB C Ñ ABB pC X V alidq.
Lemma 18. If X $ ABB C, then pAzCq X V alid Ď B.
Proof. Suppose that there is v P pAzCq X V alid such that v R B. Thus, v P A, v R C,
v P V oid, and v R B.
Recall that X $ A BB C by the assumption of the lemma. Hence, X $ v BB C
by Lemma 2 and due to v P A. Thus, X $ v BB B Y C by Lemma 4. Then,
X $ vBBzpBYCq B YC by the Early Bird axiom. In other words, X $ vB∅ B YC.
Thus, X $ v B∅ ∅ by the Trivial Path axiom. Hence, v R V alid by Definition 8,
which contradicts the choice of view v.
7.2 Instructions
For each formula A BB C P X our canonical epistemic transition system T pXq will
have a strategy to navigate from set A to set C through set B. Generally speaking, this
strategy will use a dedicated instruction associated with formula A BB C. Formally,
the set of all instructions is defined as a set of triples pA,B,Cq satisfying the three
properties listed below:
Definition 9. Let I be the set of all triples pA,B,Cq such that
1. A,B,C Ď V alid,
2. X $ ABAYB C,
3. sets A, B, and C are pairwise disjoint.
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Note that technically instruction pA,B,Cq is associated not with formula ABB C,
but rather with formula A BAYB C. This is done in order to be able to assume that
sets A, B, and C are pairwise disjoint. The next lemma is an general property of sets,
which is used later.
Lemma 19. pAYBqzC “ pAzCq Y pBzpAY Cqq.
Proof.
pAYBqzC “ pAY pBzAqqzC “ pAzCq Y ppBzAqzCq
“ pAzCq Y pBzpAY Cqq
We stated earlier that for each A BB C P X there is a dedicated instruction used
by the strategy that navigates from set A to set C through set B. In some situations
this dedicated instruction could be pA,B,Cq. However in most cases we would need
to slightly modify tuple pA,B,Cq into tuple pA1, B1, C 1q in order for it to satisfy the
three conditions from Definition 9. The next lemma specifies pA1, B1, C 1q in terms of
pA,B,Cq and proves that pA1, B1, C 1q is an instruction.
Lemma 20. If X $ A BB C, then pA1, B1, C 1q P I , where A1 “ pAzCq X V alid,
B1 “ pBzpAY Cqq X V alid, and C 1 “ C X V alid.
Proof. By Definition 9, it suffices to show that setsA1, B1, and C 1 are pairwise disjoint
and that X $ A1 BA1YB1 C 1. First, we show that these sets are pairwise disjoint:
A1 XB1 “ rpAzCq X V alids XB1 Ď AXB1
“ AX rpBzpAY Cqq X V alids Ď AX rBzAs “ ∅,
A1 X C 1 “ rpAzCq X V alids X C 1 Ď rAzCs X C 1
“ rAzCs X rC X V alids Ď rAzCs X C “ ∅,
B1 X C 1 “ rpBzpAY Cqq X V alids X C 1 Ď rBzCs X C 1
“ rBzCs X rC X V alids Ď rBzCs X C “ ∅.
Next, we show that X $ A1BA1YB1 C 1. Indeed, the assumption X $ ABB C implies
X $ AzC BB C by Lemma 2. Hence, X $ AzC BAYB C by Lemma 3. Thus,
X $ AzC BpAYBqzC C by the Early Bird axiom. Then, by Lemma 19,
X $ AzC BpAzCqYpBzpAYCqq C.
Thus, by Lemma 2,
X $ pAzCq X V alidBpAzCqYpBzpAYCqq C.
Hence, by Lemma 16,
X $ pAzCq X V alidBppAzCqYpBzpAYCqqqXV alid C.
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Thus, by Lemma 17,
X $ pAzCq X V alidBppAzCqYpBzpAYCqqqXV alid C X V alid.
Therefore, X $ A1 BA1YB1 C 1 by the choice of sets A1, B1, and C 1.
Informally, the next lemma states that if there is an instruction to navigate from a
set A to an empty set, then set A must be empty.
Lemma 21. For any pA,B,Cq P I if C “ ∅, then A “ ∅.
Proof. The assumption pA,B,Cq P I implies that X $ A BAYB C, by Definition 9.
Thus, X $ A BAYB ∅ due to the assumption C “ ∅. Hence, X $ A B∅ ∅ by the
Path to Nowhere axiom. Suppose that there is a view a P A. Hence, X $ a B∅ ∅
by Lemma 2. Thus, a R V alid by Definition 8. At the same time, A Ď V alid by
Definition 9. Hence, a R A, which is a contradiction with the choice of view a.
7.3 States and Observation Function
There are two types of states in the canonical epistemic transition system T pXq. The
first type of states comes from our intention for each v P V alid to have at least one
state w such that opwq “ v. Thus, we consider each v P V alid to be a state of the first
type and define the observation function on the states of the first type as opvq “ v.
In addition to the states of the first type, the canonical epistemic transition system
also has states of the second type. Informally, these are intermediate states representing
the result of a partial execution of an instruction. If an instruction i might transition
the system from a state w of the first type to a state v of the first type, then the same
instruction also might transition the system into a partial completion state pu, iq of the
second type. If the same instruction i is invoked in state pu, iq, then the system will
finish the transition into state v. If an instruction j ‰ i is invoked in state pu, iq, then the
system abandons the partially completed instruction i and goes into a state prescribed
by instruction j. The next two definitions formally capture this intuition. Symbol \
represents disjoint union.
Definition 10. S “ V alid\ pV alidˆ Iq.
Definition 11. opv,Bq “ v.
opwq “
#
w, if w P V alid,
v, if w “ pv, iq.
Lemma 22. opwq P V alid for each w P S.
Proof. The statement of the lemma follows from Definition 10 and Definition 11.
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A ⊔ (A × (I \ {i}))
C
(A ∪ B) × {i}
A ⊔ (A × I)
full
partial
partial
Figure 4: Transitions on instruction pA,B,Cq
7.4 Transitions
Recall that the set of states of a canonical transition model is equal to the disjoint union
V alid \ pV alid ˆ Iq. We refer to a state as having type one if it belongs to set V oid
and type two if it belongs to set V alidˆ I .
An instruction pA,B,Cq could be used to make one of the following transitions,
see Figure 4:
1. a “full” transition from any state w such that opwq P A to any state u P C of the
first type,
2. a “partial” transition from any state w such that opwq P A and state w is not
a partial completion for transition pA,B,Cq, to a state pv, pA,B,Cqq of the
second type such that v P AYB,
3. a “partial” transition from any state w such that opwq P A Y B and state w is a
partial completion for transition pA,B,Cq, to any state u P C.
The next definition captures the above informal description.
Definition 12. If i “ pA,B,Cq P I , then
Ñi “ tpa, cq | a P A\ pAˆ Iq, c P Cu
Y tpa, bq | a P A\ pAˆ pIztiuqq, b P pAYBq ˆ tiuu
Y tpb, cq | b P pAYBq ˆ tiu, c P Cu.
This concludes the definition of the canonical epistemic transition system T pXq “
pS, o, I, tÑiuiPIq. The next two lemmas prove basic properties of the transition rela-
tionÑi. These properties are used later in the proof of the completeness.
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Lemma 23. For any strategy s, any setE Ď V alid, any sequence pi PMaxPathspEq,
and any element w of pi, if spopwqq “ pA,B,Cq and opwq P A, then w cannot be the
last element of sequence pi.
Proof. By Definition 11, the assumption opwq P A implies that w P A \ pA ˆ Iq.
By Lemma 21, the same assumption opwq P A implies that there is a view c P C.
Thus, w ÑpA,B,Cq c by Definition 12. Hence, w Ñspopwqq c due to the assumption
spopwqq “ pA,B,Cq. Therefore, element w cannot be the last element of sequence pi
by Definition 5.
Lemma 24. For any strategy s, any setE Ď V alid, any sequence pi PMaxPathspEq,
and any two consecutive elements w and w1 of pi such that
1. w P A\ pAˆ Iq,
2. w1 P pAYBq ˆ tpA,B,Cqu,
3. spopw1qq “ pA,B,Cq,
the sequence pi contains an element w2 immediately after the element w1 such that
opw2q P C.
Proof. By Definition 11, assumption w P A\ pAˆ Iq implies that opwq P A. Hence,
by Lemma 21, set C contains at least one element c. Note that w1 ÑpA,B,Cq c by
Definition 12 due to the assumption w1 P pAYBq ˆ tpA,B,Cqu of the lemma. Thus,
by Definition 5, element w1 is not the last element of sequence pi.
Let w2 be the element of sequence pi that immediately follows element w1. Hence,
w1 Ñspopw1qq w2. Thus, w1 ÑpA,B,Cq w2 by the assumption spopw1qq “ pA,B,Cq of
the lemma. Then, w2 P C by Definition 12 and due to the assumption w1 P pAYBq ˆ
tpA,B,Cqu of the lemma. Therefore, opw2q P C by Definition 11.
7.5 Provability Implies Satisfiability
In this section we show if an atomic proposition is provable from set X , then it is
satisfied in the canonical epistemic transition system. The converse of this statement is
shown later in Lemma 34.
Lemma 25. If X $ ABB C, then T pXq ( ABB C.
Proof. Let i0 “ pA1, B1, C 1q, whereA1 “ pAzCqXV alid,B1 “ pBzpAYCqqXV alid,
and C 1 “ C X V alid. Thus, i0 P I by Lemma 20. Define strategy s to be a constant
function such that spvq “ i0 for each view v P V . By Definition 7, it suffices to show
that MaxPathspAq Ď UntilpB,Cq.
Consider any path pi “ w0, ¨ ¨ ¨ P MaxPathspAq. By Definition 4, opw0q P A.
Note that if opw0q P C, then pi P UntilpB,Cq by Definition 6. In the rest of the proof,
we assume that opw0q R C. Thus, opw0q P pAzCq X V alid by Lemma 22. Hence,
opw0q P A1 by the choice of set A1. Then, by Lemma 23, sequence pi must contain at
least one more element w1 after element w0. Then, w0 Ñspopw0qq w1 by Definition 4.
Hence, w0 Ñi0 w1 by the choice of strategy s. Then, w0 ÑpA1,B1,C1q w1 by the choice
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of instruction i0. By Definition 12, statement w0 ÑpA1,B1,C1q w1 implies that one of
the following three cases takes place:
Case I: w0 P A1 \ pA1 ˆ Iq and w1 P C 1. Thus, opw0q P A1 and opw1q P C 1
by Definition 11. Hence, opw0q P pAzCq X V alid and opw1q P C X V alid due to
the choice of sets A1 and C 1. Thus, opw0q P B by Lemma 18 and also opw1q P C.
Therefore, pi P UntilpB,Cq by Definition 6.
Case II: w0 P A1 \ pA1 ˆ pIzti0uqq and w1 P pA1 Y B1q ˆ ti0u. Thus, opw0q P A1
and opw1q P A1 Y B1 by Definition 11. Hence, opw0q P pAzCq X V alid and opw1q P
ppAzCqXV alidqYB1 by the choice of setA1. Hence, opw0q P B and opw1q P BYB1
by Lemma Lemma 18. Thus, opw0q, opw1q P B by the choice of set B1.
Recall thatw0 P A1\pA1ˆpIzti0uqq,w1 P pA1YB1qˆti0u, and i0 “ pA1, B1, C 1q.
Thus, by Lemma 24, sequence pi must contain an element w2 immediately after the
element w1 such that opw2q P C 1. Hence opw2q P C by the choice of set C 1. Thus, we
have opw0q, opw1q P B and opw2q P C. Therefore, pi P UntilpB,Cq by Definition 6.
Case III: w0 P pA1 YB1q ˆ ti0u and w1 P C 1. Thus, opw0q P A1 YB1 and opw1q P C 1
by Definition 11. Hence, opw0q P pppAzCq X V alidqq YB1 and opw1q P C by choice
of sets A1 and C 1. Thus, opw0q P B Y B1 by Lemma 18 and also opw1q P C. Hence,
opw0q P B by the choice of set B1. Therefore, pi P UntilpB,Cq by Definition 6.
7.6 Satisfiability Implies Provability
The goal of this section is to show the converse of Lemma 25. This result is stated later
in the section as Lemma 34. To prove the result, due to Definition 7, it suffices to show
that X & E BF G implies that MaxPathspEq Ę UntilpF,Gq for each strategy s. In
other words, we need to show that for any strategy s there is a path pi PMaxPathspEq
that either never comes to G or leaves F before coming to G. To construct this path,
we first define G˚ as a set of all starting states from which paths under strategy s
unavoidably lead to set G never leaving set F . According to Definition 14, set G˚
is a union of an infinite chain of sets G “ G0 Ď G1 Ď G2 . . . . Sets tGiuiě0 are
defined recursively below. The same definition also specifies the auxiliary families of
sets tHiuiě0, tAiuiě1, tBiuiě1, tCiuiě1, tA`i uiě1, and tB`i uiě1 that will be used to
state and prove various properties of family tGiuiě0.
Definition 13. For any sets F,G Ď V and any strategy s, let
1. G0 “ G and H0 “ ∅,
2. choose any instruction pAn, Bn, Cnq P I such that
(a) An YBn Ď F YG,
(b) ta P An | spaq “ pAn, Bn, CnquzGn´1 is not empty,
(c) ta P An | spaq ‰ pAn, Bn, Cnqu Ď Gn´1,
(d) tb P Bn | spbq ‰ pAn, Bn, Cnqu Ď Gn´1,
(e) Cn Ď Gn´1
and define
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(a) An` “ ta P An | spaq “ pAn, Bn, Cnqu,
(b) Bn` “ tb P Bn | spbq “ pAn, Bn, Cnqu,
(c) Gn “ An` YGn´1,
(d) Hn “ Bn` YHn´1.
Next we state and prove properties of the families of the sets specified in Defini-
tion 13.
Lemma 26. An ‰ Am for each n ą m.
Proof. By item (2b) of Definition 13, there must exist a view a0 P ta P An | spaq “
pAn, Bn, Cnqu such that a0 R Gn´1. Thus, a0 P An` zGn´1 by item (2a) of Defini-
tion 13.
Suppose that An “ Am. Hence, An` “ Am` by item (2a) of Definition 13. Notice
also that Gn´1 Ě Gm by item (2c) of Definition 13 and the assumption n ą m. Then,
a0 P An` zGn´1 “ Am`zGn´1 Ď Am`zGm. Hence, Am` Ę Gm, which contradicts
item (2c) of Definition 13.
Lemma 27. Sets An` and Hn´1 are disjoint.
Proof. Suppose that there is a view v such that v P An` and v P Hn´1. Hence,
by items (1) and (2d) of Definition 13, there must exist m ă n such that v P Bm`.
Thus, spvq “ pAn, Bn, Cnq and spvq “ pAm, Bm, Cmq by items (2a) and (2b) of
Definition 13, which contradicts Lemma 26.
Lemma 28. Sets Bn` and Hn´1 are disjoint.
Proof. Suppose that there is a view v such that v P Bn` and v P Hn´1. Hence, by
items (1) and (2d) of Definition 13, there must exist m ă n such that v P Bm`. Thus,
spvq “ pAn, Bn, Cnq and spvq “ pAm, Bm, Cmq by item (2b) of Definition 13, which
contradicts Lemma 26.
Lemma 29. pAn` YBn` q X pGn´1 YHn´1q Ď Gn´1, for each n ě 1.
By Lemma 27 and Lemma 28,
pAn` YBn` q X pGn´1 YHn´1q
“ ppAn` YBn` q XGn´1q Y ppAn` YBn` q XHn´1q
“ ppAn` YBn` q XGn´1q Y pAn` XHn´1q Y pBn` XHn´1q
Ď Gn´1 Y∅Y∅ “ Gn´1.
Lemma 30. X $ Gn BGnYBn` Gn´1, for each n ě 1.
Proof. Note that Cn Ď Gn´1 by item (2e) of Definition 13. Thus, $ Cn B∅ Gn´1
by the Reflexivity axiom. Also, X $ An BAnYBn Cn by Definition 9. Thus, by the
Transitivity axiom, X $ An BAnYBn Gn´1. Hence,
X $ An BpAnzAn` qYAn`YpBnzBn` qYBn` Gn´1
24
because An` Ď An and Bn` Ď Bn by item (2a) and item (2b) of Definition 13. Note
that AnzAn` Ď Gn´1 and BnzBn` Ď Gn´1 by items (2c), (2d), (2a) and (2b) of
Definition 13. Thus, by Lemma 3,
X $ An BAn`YGn´1YBn` Gn´1.
Hence, by Lemma 2 and due to item (2a) of Definition 13,
X $ An` BAn`YGn´1YBn` Gn´1.
Thus, X $ An` Y Gn´1 BAn`YGn´1YBn` Gn´1 by the Augmentation axiom. Then,
X $ Gn BGnYBn` Gn´1 by by item (2c) of Definition 13.
Lemma 31. X $ Gn BGnYHn G
Proof. We prove this statement by induction on n. If n “ 0, then Gn “ G by item (1)
of Definition 13. Therefore, $ Gn BGnYHn G by the Reflexivity axiom.
Suppose that n ą 0. Thus, X $ Gn BGnYBn` Gn´1 by Lemma 30. Thus, by the
Early Bird axiom,
X $ Gn BpGnzGn´1qYpBn` zGn´1q Gn´1.
Then, by item (2c) of Definition 13,
X $ Gn BAn`YpBn` zGn´1q Gn´1.
Hence, by Lemma 3,
X $ Gn BAn`YBn` Gn´1.
At the same time, by the induction hypothesis,
X $ Gn´1 BGn´1YHn´1 G.
Thus, by Lemma 6 taking into account Lemma 29,
X $ Gn BAn`YBn`YGn´1YHn´1 G.
Therefore, X $ Gn BGnYHn G by items (2c) and (2d) of Definition 13.
Definition 14. G˚ “ ŤnGn.
Lemma 32. There is n ě 0 such that G˚ “ Gn.
Proof. By Definition 13 and Definition 14, we have G0 Ď G1 Ď G2 ¨ ¨ ¨ Ď G˚ Ď V .
Thus, the statement of the lemma follows from the assumption in Section 2 that set V
is finite.
Lemma 33. Gn YHn Ď F YG.
Proof. Consider any n ě 0. Note thatAnYBn Ď F YG by line (2a) of Definition 13.
Thus,An`YBn` Ď FYG by line (2a) and line (2b) of Definition 13. Hence,An`YBn` Ď
F YG for all n ě 0. Then, GnYHn Ď F YG for all n ě 0 by by line (2a), line (2c),
and line (2d) of Definition 13.
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We are now ready to state and prove the main lemma of this section. The statement
of this lemma is the contrapositive of Lemma 25.
Lemma 34. If T pXq ( E BF G, then X $ E BF G.
Proof. Suppose that T pXq ( EBF G. Thus, by Definition 7, there is a strategy s such
that MaxPathspEq Ď UntilpF,Gq.
Consider chain of sets G0 Ď G1 Ď G2 Ď . . . and set G˚, as specified in Defini-
tion 13 and Definition 14, constructed based on sets F and G as well as strategy s. We
consider the following two cases separately:
Case I: E X V alid Ď G˚. Thus, by the Reflexivity axiom
$ pE X V alidqB∅ G˚. (12)
At the same time, X $ pEzV alidq B∅ ∅ by Lemma 15. Hence, X $ pEzV alidq Y
pEXV alidqB∅ pEXV alidq by the Augmentation axiom. In other words,X $ EB∅
pEXV alidq. This, together with statement (12) by the Transitivity axiom implies that
X $ E B∅ G˚. Thus, by Lemma 32, there is n ě 0 such that X $ E B∅ Gn. Hence,
X $ EBGnYHnG by Lemma 31 and the Transitivity axiom. Hence, X $ EBFYGG
by Lemma 33 and Lemma 3. Thus, X $ E BpFYGqzG G by the Early Bird axiom.
Note that pF YGqzG Ď F . Therefore, X $ E BF G by Lemma 3.
Case II: there is e P pE X V alidqzG˚. Let
W “ pV zG˚q Y tpw, iq P pV zG˚q ˆ I | spopwqq ‰ iu.
Let pi be a maximal (either finite or infinite) sequence w0, w1, . . . of elements from set
W such that
1. w0 “ e,
2. wi Ñspopwiqq wi`1 for all i ě 0.
Claim 1. Sequence pi is finite.
Proof of Claim. If sequence pi is infinite then pi P MaxPathspEq by Definition 5,
opw0q “ opeq P pE X V alidqzG˚ Ď E, and item (2) above. At the same time
pi R UntilpF,Gq by Definition 6 because opwiq P opW q Ď V zG˚ Ď V zG0 “ V zG
for each i ě 0. Thus, MaxPathspEq Ę UntilpF,Gq, which is a contradiction with
the choice of strategy s.
Let wk be the last element of sequence pi and pA,B,Cq “ spopwkqq. By pr1 and
pr2 we mean the first and the second projection of a pair.
Claim 2. If wk P V ˆ I , then pr2pwkq ‰ pA,B,Cq.
Proof of Claim. Suppose that pr2pwq “ pA,B,Cq. Then, by the choice of instruction
pA,B,Cq, we have pr2pwkq “ spopwkqq. Thus, wk R W by the choice of set W ,
which is a contradiction with the choice of sequence pi.
Claim 3. opwkq P A.
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Proof of Claim. Suppose opwkq R A. First we show pi P MaxPathspEq. Assume
pi R MaxPathspEq. Thus, by Definition 5 and because opw0q P E, there must exist
state wk`1 P S such that wk Ñspopwkqq wk`1. Hence, wk ÑpA,B,Cq wk`1 by the
choice of the instruction pA,B,Cq. Thus, by Definition 12, the assumption opwkq R A
implies that wk P pA Y Bq ˆ tpA,B,Cqu, which is a contradiction with Claim 2.
Therefore, pi PMaxPathspEq.
Recall that MaxPathspEq Ď UntilpF,Gq by the choice of strategy s. Hence,
pi P UntilpF,Gq. Thus, by Definition 6, there is m ě 0 such that opwmq P G. Hence,
opwmq P G0 by Definition 13. Thus, opwmq P G˚ by Definition 14. Therefore,
wm R W by the choice of W and Definition 11, which is a contradiction with the
choice of sequence pi.
Claim 4. C Ď G˚.
Proof of Claim. Suppose that there is c P C such that c R G˚. Note that opwkq P A
by Claim 3. Thus, wk ÑpA,B,Cq c by Definition 12 and the assumption c P C. At the
same time, the assumption c R G˚ implies c P V zG˚. Which implies that c P W by
the choice of set W . Hence, sequence pi can be extended by at least one more element,
namely by state c, which is a contradiction with the choice of sequence pi.
Claim 5. AYB Ď F YG.
Proof of Claim. Suppose that there is x P pA Y BqzpF Y Gq. Recall that opwkq P
A. Thus, wk P A \ pA ˆ pIztpA,B,Cquqq by Definition 11 and Claim 2. Thus,
wk ÑpA,B,Cq px, pA,B,Cqq by Definition 12 and because x P A Y B. Let pi1 “
pi, px, pA,B,Cqq. In other words, pi1 is the extension of sequence pi by an additional
element px, pA,B,Cqq. Note that pi1 P PathspEq by the choice of sequence pi and
because wk ÑpA,B,Cq px, pA,B,Cqq. By Lemma 1, sequence pi1 can be extended to a
sequence pi2 PMaxPathspEq. Thus, pi2 P UntilpF,Gq by the choice of strategy s.
At the same time, w1, . . . , wk P W by the choice of sequence pi. Thus, we have
opw1q, . . . , opwkq R G˚ by the choice of set W . Then, opw1q, . . . , opwkq R G0
by Definition 14. Hence, opw1q, . . . , opwkq R G by Definition 13. Recall that x P
pA Y BqzpF Y Gq. Thus, opx, pA,B,Cqq R F Y G. Then, opx, pA,B,Cqq R F and
opw1q, . . . , opwkq, opx, pA,B,Cqq R G. Therefore, pi2 R UntilpF,Gq by Definition 6,
which is a contradiction with the above observation pi2 P UntilpF,Gq.
Claim 6. tx P AYB | spxq ‰ pA,B,Cqu Ď G˚.
Proof of Claim. Let there be x P A Y B such that spxq ‰ pA,B,Cq and x R G˚.
Recall that opwkq P A. Thus, wk P A \ pA ˆ pIztpA,B,Cquqq by Definition 11 and
Claim 2. Thus, wk ÑpA,B,Cq px, pA,B,Cqq by Definition 12 and because x P AYB.
At the same time, opx, pA,B,Cqq “ x R G˚ by Definition 11 and the assumption
x R G˚. Hence, px, pA,B,Cqq P W by the assumption spxq ‰ pA,B,Cq and the
choice of W .
Therefore, sequence pi can be extended by at least one more element, namely by
state px, pA,B,Cqq, which is a contradiction with the choice of sequence pi.
We are now ready to finish the proof of the lemma. Note that set GnzGn´1 is not
empty for each n ě 0 by item (2b) of Definition 13. Thus, the recursive construction of
chain G0 Ď G1 Ď G2 . . . , as given in Definition 13, must terminate due to set V being
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finite. Suppose that the last element of the chain G0 Ď G1 Ď G2 . . . is set Gk´1. To
come to a contradiction, it suffices to show that at least one more set can be added to
the chain G0 Ď G1 Ď G2 . . . by choosing instruction pAn, Bn, Cnq to be pA,B,Cq.
To prove the latter, we need to show that instruction pA,B,Cq satisfies conditions
(2a) through (2e) of Definition 13. Indeed, condition (2a) is satisfied by Claim 5.
Condition (2b) is satisfied because spopwkqq P A by Claim 3 and opwkq R Gk´1 “ G˚
becausewk PW by Claim 2. Conditions (2c) and (2d) are satisfied by Claim 6. Finally,
condition (2e) is satisfied by Claim 4. This concludes the proof of the lemma.
7.7 Completeness: The Final Steps
In this section we use Lemma 25 and Lemma 34 to finish the proof of the completeness
theorem. The completeness theorem itself is stated below as Theorem 2.
Lemma 35. T pXq ( ϕ if and only if ϕ P X .
Proof. Induction on the structural complexity of formula ϕ. In the base case the state-
ment of the lemma follows from Lemma 25 and Lemma 34. The induction step follows
from the maximality and the consistency of set X in the standard way.
Theorem 2. If T ( ϕ for every epistemic transition system T , then $ ϕ.
Proof. Suppose& ϕ. LetX be a maximal consistent set containing formula ϕ. Thus,
T pXq (  ϕ by Lemma 35. Therefore, T pXq * ϕ.
8 Conclusion
The main informal contribution of this article is the observation that unlike its unre-
stricted counterpart, the restricted navigability relation is transitive not only for recall
strategies but also for amnesic strategies. The main technical result is the completeness
theorem for a logical system capturing the properties of the restricted navigability. Our
setting is significantly different from the one in an earlier work by Li and Wang [27],
where a navigation strategy is defined not as a function on views but as a fixed sequence
of instructions. As a result, the logical system that we propose is also significantly dif-
ferent from the one introduced by Li and Wang.
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